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DAMAGES UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974:
COMPENSATION AND DETERRENCE
INTRODUCTION

The right to privacy is crucial to the existence of any free society.'
The Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act or Act) 2 was enacted to preserve
this right3 and to protect citizens from the growing number of invasions of privacy perpetrated by government agencies through the use
of increasingly sophisticated information-gathering technology. 4 The
major goals of the Act are to compensate the victims of these invasions5 and to deter such illegal conduct in the future. 6 The Act is

1. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled, Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886). When debating the Privacy Act, Congress emphasized that "uncontrolled
Government snooping is a dangerous assault on our constitutional liberties [, which]
are the cornerstone of our democratic system .... A society cannot remain free and
tolerate a Government which can invade an individual's privacy at will." 120 Cong.
Rec. 36,901 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); see id. at 36,896 (remarks of Sen.
Muskie) ("The privacy of our citizens has been a fundamental concern since the
founding of our Republic."); id. at 36,648 (remarks of Rep. Alexander) ("[Privacy] is
not only the bedrock of freedom[, it] is the very essence of democracy."); id. at
12,646 (Introductory Remarks of Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. on S.3418) ("It seems
that now, as never before, the appetite of government and private organizations for
information about individuals threatens to usurp the right to privacy which I have
long felt to be among the most basic of our civil liberties as a free people.").
2. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982)).
3. Id. §§ 2(a), (b) (Congressional findings and statement of purpose), reprinted
in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 416-17 (1982).
4. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,912 (1974) (Government Operations Committee Oversight); id. at 36,902-03 (remarks of Sen. Jackson); id. at 36,893 (remarks of Sen.
Percy); id. at 36,652 (remarks of Rep. Broyhill); id. at 36,648 (remarks of Rep.
Goldwater); id. at 36,652 (remarks of Rep. Regula).
5. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b)(6), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896
(1974) (One stated purpose of the Act is to subject the United States to "any damages"
caused by actionable violations.), reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 416-17 (1982);
120 Cong. Rec. 36,897 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (plaintiffs entitled to "damages for injuries resulting from the misuse of personal information"); id. at 36,645
(remarks of Rep. Abzug) (purpose of actual damages is compensation); id. at 36,644
(presentation of H.R. 16,373 to the House by Rep. Moorehead on behalf of the
Committee on Government Operations) (civil damages available to compensate for
injuries). Even if Congress had been silent on this subject, damages are presumed to
serve a compensatory purpose in addition to any other purposes intended by Congress. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255-57 (1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Nahmod,

Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort Liability, 50 Ind. L.J. 5, 9-10 (1974)
(same).
6. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896
(1974), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 416-17 (1982); Protecting Individual
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intended to be self-enforcing7 through its remedial provisions, which
permit successful plaintiffs to recover "actual damages" from the
government. 8
The term "actual damages," however, has no generally accepted
legal definition, 9 and is not clearly defined in the Privacy Act. 10 This
ambiguity has led to the development of two judicial approaches to
the interpretation of the term "actual damages." The Eleventh Circuit
has adopted a restrictive view of "actual damages" and strictly limits
the measure of damages recoverable to proven out-of-pocket loss."
Recently, the Fifth Circuit formulated a liberal view of the measure of
"actual damages," allowing successful plaintiffs to recover damages
for proven mental and physical injury as well as economic loss. 12 This

Privacy in Federal Gathering, Use and Disclosure of Information, S. Rep. No. 1183,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 1-2 (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No. 1183], reprinted in
1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6916, 6916-17; H.R. Rep. No. 1416, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 38 (1974) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No. 1416], reprinted in Joint
Comm. on Gov't Operations, Legislative History of the Privacy Act of 1974, 294,
330-31 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Sourcebook]; 120 Cong. Rec. 40,409-10 (1974)
(remarks of Sen. Muskie); id, at 36,891-92 (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 36,651-52
(remarks of Rep. Biaggi); id. at 36,646-47 (remarks of Rep. Horton); id. at 36,644
(Rep. Moorhead presenting H.R. 16,373 to the House).
7. S. Rep. No. 1183, supra note 6, at 83, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 6916, 6996-67; H.R. Rep. No. 1416, supra note 6, at 38 (Additional
Views), reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 6, at 330; 120 Cong. Rec. 36,897
(remarks of Sen. Muskie); see id. at 36,652 (remarks of Rep. Regula).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (1982).
9. Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d 971,
974 (5th Cir. 1983); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 329 (l1th Cir. 1982): Privacy
Protection Study Commission, Personal Privacy in an Information Society 530 (1977)
(report) [hereinafter cited as PPSC Report]. Depending on the jurisdiction, actual
damages may be limited to out-of-pocket loss or alternatively may compensate mental distress, humiliation and embarassment in addition to pecuniary loss. Compare
Skipper v. South Central Bell Tel. Co., 334 So. 2d 863, 866 (Ala. 1976) (actual
damages are compensatory and include humiliation and embarrasment) and Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172, 176-77 (Fla. 1974) (actual damages include
shame, mortification, mental anguish or hurt feelings if proven), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 424 U.S. 448, 459-61 (1976) and Alber v. Nolle, 98 N.M.
100, 106-07, 645 P.2d 456, 462-63 (Ct. App. 1982) (actual damages include recovery
for pain and suffering) with Morvant v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 429
F.2d 495, 496 (5th Cir. 1970) (actual damages are pecuniary damages) and Public
Fin. Co. v. Van Blaricome, 324 N.W.2d 716, 725 (Iowa 1982) (same).
10. Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d 971,
974 (5th Cir. 1983); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 329 (11th Cir. 1982); Houston
v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24, 30 (D.D.C. 1979); see Fiorella
v. United States, 2 Gov't Disclosure Serv. (P-H) 81,363, at 81,942, 81,947 (W.D.
Wash. 1981); PPSC Report, supra note 9, at 530.
11. Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (11th Cir. 1982); accord Houston v.
United States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24, 30 (D.D.C. 1979).
12. Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d 971,
986 (5th Cir. 1983). The liberal view has been approved in dictum by the Tenth
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difference in interpretation is significant because it will determine the
effectiveness of the remedial provisions of the Act. 13 Too restrictive an
interpretation would reduce the incentives for citizen enforcement,
thereby frustrating the compensatory and deterrent purposes of the
Act. An overly liberal interpretation, however, would have a negative
impact on efficiency in government, and might expose the government to excessive damage liability. Consequently, a determination of
the proper scope of the term "actual damages" requires finding the
optimum balance between these competing considerations.
This Note contends that Congress intended the term "actual damages" in the Privacy Act to include proven mental and physical injury
in addition to economic loss. Part I of this Note traces the historical
development of legal protections of privacy in American law up to the
passage of the Privacy Act. Based on analysis of the language and
legislative history of the Act and analogous areas of the law, Part II
concludes that a liberal interpretation of "actual damages" most effectively furthers the goals of the Privacy Act. Finally, Part III explores
the economic implications of the remedial provisions of the Act and
recommends legislative changes to better balance the privacy rights of
individuals and the interests of the government.
I.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL PROTECTIONS OF PRIVACY

A. The Common-Law Tort: Invasion of Privacy
Protections for privacy interests have been recognized in American
law since the early 1900's. 14 The first legal protection for privacy
interests developed by American courts was the common-law tort of
invasion of privacy. 15 Since the early 1900's this tort has been adopted
Circuit. See Parks v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 677, 682-83

(10th Cir. 1980).
13. One of the enumerated purposes of the Privacy Act is to subject the Government to civil liability for "any damages" caused by actionable violations of the Act.
Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(b)(6), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974),
reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 417 (1982). Congress viewed this aspect of the
remedial provisions as a vital element of the Act. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,897 (remarks
of Sen. Muskie) (Act allows citizen to enforce his "fundamental rights" through the
remedial provisions); id. at 36,644 (remarks of Rep. Moorehead) (civil remedies are
the "legal teeth" of the Act).
14. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A comment a (1976); G. White, Tort
Law in America 173-76 (1980); Prosser, Privacy, 48 Calif. L. Rev. 383, 383-85
(1960).
15. Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 Law & Contemp.
Probs. 253, 257-59 (1966); Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. Probs. 326, 327 (1966). Following a seminal
article in the Harvard Law Review, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890), the tort appeared in a 1903 New York statute, 1903 N.Y.
Laws ch. 132, §§ 1-2 (codified at N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976 &
Supp. 1983-1984)); see W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 117, at 803 (4th
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by statute or common law in nearly every state.16 Although the scope
of the tort varies among the states, 17 it is generally aimed at protecting
four types of privacy interests: appropriation of another's name or
likeness; unreasonable publicity of another's private life; publicity
that presents an individual in a false light; and intrusion into an
individual's private affairs, seclusion or solitude.18 Because privacy is a
dignitary interest, 19 the injuries caused by actionable invasions are
difficult to measure and cannot be fully compensated by money damages. 20 Consequently, at common law successful plaintiffs in invasion
of privacy actions may recover general damages for the injury to their

ed. 1971), Kalven, supra, at 331. A common-law tort of invasion of privacy was
subsequently established by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1905. Pavesich v. New
England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); see Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 652A comment a (1976); Larremore, The Law of Privacy, 12 Colum. L. Rev.
693, 693-94 (1912).
16. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A app., at 268 (Reporter's Note) (1981).
The tort of invasion of privacy is explicitly recognized in forty states and the District
of Columbia. Four states have decided privacy cases on other grounds, three states
have not addressed the issue and three other states have rejected the tort. Id. at 26869.
17. See id. at 268 ("The tort action for invasion of the right of privacy, in one
form or another, is presently recognized in [most states.]"); W. Prosser, supra note
15, § 117, at 804 ("In one form [or] another, the right of privacy is by this time
recognized and accepted in all but a very few jurisdictions."); see, e.g., Galella v.
Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 995 n.12 (2d Cir. 1973) (tort plaintiff limited to statutory
remedy for appropriation of name or likeness; no common law tort of invasion of
privacy recognized in New York); Bureau of Credit Control v. Scott, 36 Ill. App. 3d
1006, 1009, 345 N.E.2d 37, 40 (1976) (tort of invasion of privacy limited to appropriation of name or likeness); Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 77,,
391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1979) (statutory tort cause of action for unreasonable, substantial or serious interference with privacy); see also Ward v. Connor, 495 F. Supp. 434,
439-40 (E.D. Va. 1980) (common-law tort of invasion of privacy not recognized in
Virginia), rev'd on other grounds, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
907 (1982); cf. Deaton v. Delta Democrat Publ. Co., 326 So. 2d 471, 473 (Miss.
1976) (common-law tort of invasion of privacy has developed "amid a welter of
confusing judicial pronouncements").
18. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977); W. Prosser, supra note 15,
§ 117, at 804-14. The Privacy Act is concerned with improper governmental collection, use and dissemination of personal information. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-579, § 2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974). Consequently, the interests protected by three of the branches of the tort: public disclosure, false light and intrusion
are relevant to the interests protected by the Act.
19. D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of Remedies § 7.1, at 509 (1973); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 962, 1002-03 (1964); see Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d
705, 710-11 (Ala. 1983); Morrow v. Kings Dep't Stores, Inc., 57 N.C. App. 13, 18,
290 S.E. 732, 735 (1982) (quoting Byrd, Recovery for Mental Anguish in North
Carolina, 58 N.C.L. Rev. 435, 443 (1980)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A
comment a (1977).
20. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 comment a, at 453-54 (1979); D.
Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.1, at 509; see, e.g., Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F.
Supp. 967, 986-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), modified, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); Phillips
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privacy interest and for proven mental injury. 2' In addition, plaintiffs
may recover their special damages.2 2 Although this tort action may
23
adequately protect individuals from invasions by their fellow citizens
and possibly by their state government,2 4 Congress realized that it was
ineffective against agencies of the federal government. 25 The Privacy
Act was intended, in part, to fill this gap in the legal protection of
privacy.26

v. Smalley Maint. Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 711-12 (Ala. 1983); Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Ashley, 563 S.W.2d 637, 639 (Tex. 1978) (quoting Billings v. Atkinson,
489 S.W.2d 858, 860-61 (Tex. 1973)). Injuries such as mental distress, humiliation
and loss of reputation cannot be accurately measured in monetary terms. Because
true compensation is usually impossible, money damages are awarded to approximate the harm done. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 comment a (1977); D.
Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.1, at 509.
21. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 986-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1977),
modified, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville
Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 888 (Ky. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 975 (1982);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1976); see D. Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.3, at
528; 3 L. Frumer, R. Benoit & M. Friedman, Personal Injury-Actions-DamagesDefenses § 8.03 (1965).
22. Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), modified, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652H (1976).
Special damages are limited to economic damages to the plaintiff flowing from the
tortious conduct and must be specifically alleged and proven. Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 904 comment b (1977); D. Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 531; 3 L.
Frumer, R. Benoit & M. Friedman, supra note 21, § 8.04.
23. See W. Prosser, supra note 15, § 117; Kalven, supra note 15, at 333-39.
24. See W. Prosser, supra note 15, § 131, at 975-77.
25. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,882 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead); id. at 36,91415 (remarks of Sen. Huddleston). Although individuals can sue the federal government for invasion of privacy under the Federal Tort Claims Act, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), see Birnbaum v.
United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 976 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (invasion of privacy is actionable under the Federal Tort Claims Act), modified on other grounds, 588 F.2d 319
(2d Cir. 1978); Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An InterpretativeAnalysis, 54 N.C.L. Rev. 497, 518-19
(1976) (same), plaintiffs must make out their cause of action under the applicable
state law, Birnbaum, 588 F.2d at 327-28; W. Prosser, supra note 15, § 131, at 972.
Congress did not believe that the protection offered by this and other existing legal
protections was sufficient. 120 Cong. Rec. 40,880-81 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorehead).
26. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,409-10 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie). When it
drafted the Privacy Act Congress had concluded that both the judicial and legislative
branches of government had failed to adequately protect privacy and that it must
take the initiative to provide legislative protections. Id. at 40,410. ("While the courts
have begun to recognize the capacity and the practices of the government to invade
the privacy of its citizens, it is the responsibility of the Congress to develop legislative
protection against those invasions."); id. at 36,914 (remarks of Sen. Huddleston)
("[D]ue to the nature of the courts, this response has often been slow and incomplete
.... Thus, what is needed now is a coordinated and comprehensive approach to the
problems that can be provided only by the Congress."); id. at 36,649 (remarks of
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B. The ConstitutionalRight and the Privacy Act
The Supreme Court has only recently recognized a general constitutional right to privacy.2 7 The Court has applied this right on a caseby-case basis, 2 but has never defined the scope of the protected
privacy interest.2 9 As a result, when Congress enacted the Privacy Act
there was uncertainty whether areas of privacy not previously addressed by the Court, such as government agency information practices, would be entitled to constitutional protection." Cognizant of

Rep. Goldwater) ("[The Privacy Act] is an important ... first step in the restoration
of the individual's right to privacy. . . . We must reestablish . . . the right to be left
alone for the people of this country."). The common-law tort of invasion of privacy
did, however, offer guidance with regard to the appropriate measure of damages for
invasions of privacy, and influenced Congress in the drafting of the Act. Johnson v.
Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d 971, 976-77 (5th Cir.
1983); Parks v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 677, 683 (10th Cir.
1980); see H.R. Rep. No. 1416, supra note 6, at 9-10, reprintedin Sourcebook, supra
note 6, at 302-03; 120 Cong. Rec. 36,904 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
27. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); see J. Nowak, R.
Rotunda & J. Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 738 (2d ed. 1983); H. Oleck,
Oleck's Tort Law Practice Manual § 224, at 296 (1982); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 11-3, at 570-71 (1978); Posner, The Uncertaintyof Privacy Protection
b, the Supreme Court, 1979 Sup. Ct. Rev. 173, 197.
Although the Constitution does not specifically establish a right to privacy, the
Court has found such a right by inference in many areas. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.
693, 712 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653
F.2d 1080, 1087 (6th Cir. 1981); H. Oleck, supra, § 224, at 296; see Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, & J. Young,
supra, at 734-35; L. Tribe, supra, § 15-3.
28. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 & n.26 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 1981);
Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir. 1981); Clark, ConstitutionalSources of
the Penumbral Right to Privacy, 19 Viii. L. Rev. 833, 881-84 (1974); Comment, A
Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64 Calif. L. Rev.
1447, 1448 (1976).
29. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-13 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1558-59 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 548 (1983); Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of
Constitutional Privacy: Beyond the Ideology of FamilialPrivacy, 14 Harv. C.R.C.L. L. Rev. 361, 361 (1979). The confusion resulting from the lack of a clear
definition of the extent of the right to privacy is evident in the area of the right to
non-disclosure of private information by government. Compare United States v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-78 (3d Cir. 1980) (general constitutional right to non-disclosure of private information) with J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d
1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (no general constitutional right to non-disclosure of
private information).
30. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,914 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston); id. at
36,896-97 (remarks of Sen. Muskie); id. at 36,648 (remarks of Rep. Goldwater). The
Supreme Court did not address the issue of informational privacy and government
agency practices until 1977, in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). See J. Nowak, R.
Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 27, at 760. In Whalen the Court suggested that a
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the lack of judicial guidance in this area, one Congressional goal in
drafting the Privacy Act was to dispel any confusion as to whether
of
specified disclosures by government agencies constituted violations
3
the right to privacy and to provide necessary safeguards. 1
In 1976, after the passage of the Privacy Act, the Supreme Court
intimated in Whalen v. Roe32 that the right to privacy may, to some
undefined extent, apply to government agency information activities.3 3 In Whalen the Court divided the privacy interests protected by
the constitution into two basic types: "[T]he individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and ... the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions. ' 34 The interest in independent decision-making encompasses the freedom to
make personal decisions regarding matters such as abortion, contraception, education, marriage and divorce.3 5 The Privacy Act, however, addresses itself to the branch of constitutionally protected privacy relating to the prevention of disclosure of personal matters in the
3
context of the interaction of government agencies with individuals. 1
Courts facing this constitutional issue generally employ a balancing
test, weighing the degree of intrusion on the individual against the
governmental interest that ostensibly justifies the intrusion.3 7 This

constitutional right to informational privacy might exist, but did not define the
contours of this right. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605-06.
31. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974),
reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 552a note, at 416-17 (1982). Congress found that "the right to
privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Constitution of the
United States." Id. Congress also determined that it must "regulate the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of information by . . . agencies" to preserve
and protect the right to privacy. Id.
32. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
33. Id. at 605.
34. Id. at 599-600.
35. Id. at 599-600 & n.26; Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d
570, 577 (3d Cir. 1980).
36. See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974),
reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note, at 416-17 (1982). Congress found that government
agency information practices posed a serious threat to individuals' privacy rights, and
concluded that the gathering, use and dissemination of personal information must be
regulated. Id.
37. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.) (The existence
of a right of non-disclosure of personal information in a given case is determined by
balancing privacy intrusion against the governmental interest.), cert. denied, 104 S.
Ct. 548 (1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d
Cir. 1980) (same); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 670 (5th Cir. 1979)
(same), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981); Schachter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d
Cir. 1978) (same); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1136-37 (5ih Cir. 1978)
(same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). But see J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080,
1089-91 (6th Cir. 1981) (no general constitutional right of non-disclosure of private
information: balancing test is not appropriate).
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test, however, is utilized on a case-by-case basis.3 Consequently,
uncertainty as to the scope of the constitutional right to privacy still
exists39 and the Privacy Act remains an individual's only comprehensive source of protection from privacy invasions by federal government agencies.4 0
At the time of the debate over the Privacy Act there was widespread
public opinion that the federal government was invading individuals'
privacy as a matter of course without serious opposition from the
judicial or legislative branches of government. 4' The debate on the
Act reflects Congress' conviction that it was acting with a strong
mandate from the American public to restrain government. 42 It was in
this atmosphere that the Privacy Act was passed, and the strength of
this conviction is reflected in the scope, structure and legislative history of the Act.

38. See Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 548 (1983); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578
(3d Cir. 1980); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 670 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1076 (1981).
39. Posner, supra note 27, at 213-14. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying
text.
40. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,880 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Moorhead). During the
debate on the Privacy Act it was noted that the Act is the first meaningful privacy
legislation passed by Congress since the fourth amendment. Id. The concerns which
prompted Congress to enact the Privacy Act have not abated since 1974, and have, in
fact, been aggravated by the rapid advances in information technology. Id. at 36,652
(remarks of Rep. Regula); see N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at A23, col. 2; id. Sept. 8,
1983, at Al, col. 3. See generally D. Burnham, The Rise of the Computer State 185225 (1983) (discussion of the shortcomings of legislative attempts to protect privacy).
41. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,897 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Muskie) (The Privacy Act
should "help begin to restore public faith in our Government's information practices."); id. at 36,900 (remarks of Sen. Nelson) ("[I]ndividual liberty has been eroded
by an expanding web of snooping conducted at all levels of government. . . which
make[s] a mockery of the individual freedoms guaranteed by our Constitution."); id.
at 36,647-48 (remarks of Rep. Alexander) ("Government has been overcome by a
snooping mania. . . . Every American must insist that Government is the servant of
the people-not our master."); id. at 36,643-44 (remarks of Rep. Moorehead)
("Americans want to see more credibility in Government. . ... ). This opinion was
reinforced by the increasingly sophisticated information-gathering technology available to government agencies. For example, at the time of the debate on the Act, it
was technologically feasible for the government to install an information system that
could maintain a record containing twenty typed pages of information on every
individual in the United States, which could be recalled in less than a minute. Id. at
36,916 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoff) (quoting Report of the National Academy of
Sciences (1972)).
42. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,900-03 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id. at 36,643
(remarks of Rep. Moorhead).
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DAMAGES UNDER THE PRIVACY

ACT

A. Scope and Structure of the Privacy Act
The Privacy Act protects personal privacy from unwarranted invasions by imposing restrictions on federal agencies with regard to the
gathering, use and dissemination of information. 43 The Act prohibits
the disclosure of a record contained in a system of records maintained
by a federal agency unless the disclosure is made pursuant to the
written request or with the consent of the individual to whom the
record pertains. 44 This general prohibition, however, is subject to
twelve exceptions, which permit disclosure when specified governmental or societal interests are shown. 45 The Act thus embodies an
government with
attempt to balance the societal interest in efficient
46
the individuals' interest in personal privacy.
The Privacy Act requires that all agencies maintaining a system of
records keep a detailed accounting of disclosures. 47 In addition, the
agency must notify all persons or agencies to whom a record has been
disclosed of any corrections or amendments made to the record and of
any subsequent disputes regarding the record. 48 The Act gives any
individual who is the subject of a record maintained in a system of
records by an agency a right of access to that record. 49 This right is
complemented by the right to request an amendment of the record to
correct any items that are not "accurate, relevant, timely, or complete."5 0
The Act further sets forth specific requirements governing agency
information policies and practices. These requirements are indicative
of the high degree of regulatory control Congress intended to build
to
into the Act. Agencies may only collect information that is relevant
5
and necessary for the accomplishment of their purpose or mission. ' If
information being collected may affect determinations regarding an
individual's rights, benefits and privileges under any federal program,
the agency must, to the greatest extent possible, collect the informa-

43. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2, 88 Stat. 1896, 1896 (1974),
reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 416-17 (1982); see Note, Narrowing the "Routine

Use"Exemption to the Privacy Act of 1974, 14 U. Mich. J.L. Ref. 126, 128-29 (1980).
44. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982).
45. Id. § 552a(b)(1)-(12).
46. H.R. Rep. No. 1416, supra note 6, at 4, reprintedin Sourcebook, supra note
6, at 297; 120 Cong. Rec. 36,647-48 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Alexander); id. at
36,647 (remarks of Rep. Gude); see id. at 36,891 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
47. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c) (1982).
48. Id. § 552a(c)(4).
49. Id. § 552a(d).
50. Id. § 552a(d)(2)(B)(i).
51. Id. § 552a(e)(1).
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tion directly from the individual who is the subject of the record.5 2
Agencies are also responsible for establishing and maintaining techni-

cal, physical, organizational and operational safeguards in all systems
of records to prevent any threat or harm to the security of such systems
that could result in substantial harm, embarrassment, inconvenience
or unfairness53 to any individual with respect to whom a record is
maintained.
The remedial provisions of the Privacy Act allow plaintiffs to recover damages from the government in two situations.5 4 The first is
when the defendant agency's failure to maintain properly a plaintiff's
record has resulted in an adverse decision in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights or opportunities of, or
benefits to the individual that may be made on the basis of such
record. 5 5 The second situation subjects the government to liability for
any agency noncompliance with the Privacy Act that has had an
adverse effect on the plaintiff. 56 If either of these events occur, and the
court hearing the case determines that the agency action was "intentional or willful,"5 7 the plaintiff may recover his "actual damages" but
in no event less than $1,000. 5 8 To determine the scope of the privacy
protections established by the remedial provisions of the Act, it is
52. Id. § 552a(e)(2).
53. Id. § 552a(e)(10).
54. Id. §§ 552a(g)(1)(C), (D), (4). The damages section of the remedial provisions of the Privacy Act provide that:
Whenever an agency...
(C) fails to maintain any record concerning any individual with such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is necessary to assure fairness in any determination relating to the qualifications, character, rights, or
opportunities of, or benefits to the individual that may be made on the basis
of such record, and consequently a determination is made which is adverse
to the individual; or
(D) fails to comply with any other provision of this section, or any rule
promulgated thereunder, in such a way as to have an adverse effect on an
individual, the individual may bring a civil action against the agency, .
(4) In any suit brought under the provisions of subsection (g)(1) (C) or (D) of
this section in which the court determines that the agency acted in a manner
which was intentional or willful, the United States shall be liable to the
individual in an amount equal to the sum of(A) actual damages sustained by the individual as a result of the refusal or
failure, but in no case shall a person entitled to recovery receive less than the
sum of $1,000 ....

Id.
55. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C).
56. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(D).
57. Id. § 552a(g)(4).
58. Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A). A plaintiff is also entitled to recover his reasonable costs
and attorney fees if he has "substantially prevailed." Id. § 552a(g)(4)(B).

1984]

DAMAGES UNDER THE PRIVACY ACT

necessary to examine the meaning Congress intended to confer on the
term "actual damages."
B. Analysis of "Actual Damages"
1. Statutory Language
The primary indication of Congressional intent is the language of
the Privacy Act itself.5 9 Although the meaning of the term "actual
damages" is unclear on the face of the statute, 60 the broad range of
potential bases of civil liability 6' created by Congress indicate that it
intended a liberal interpretation of "actual damages." The Privacy
Act requires agencies to take precautions to avoid causing "substantial
harm, embarassment, inconvenience, or unfairness to any individual"
who is the subject of a record. 2 Additionally, any failure on the part
of an agency to maintain properly a record that results in an adverse
determination relating to an individual's qualifications, character,
rights, or opportunities exposes the agency to liability.6 3 The interests
protected by these provisions are, in large part, dignitary interests that
can only be measured in terms of mental or physical injury.6 4 Indeed,
in most instances, the economic loss caused by the injury is likely to be
a small component of the total loss.65 Consequently, a restrictive view

59. See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); United
States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 121 (1980); Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,
42 (1979). Unless a clear and contrary legislative intent is demonstrated, the plain
language of a statute is controlling. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory
Construction § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973); see American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456
U.S. 63, 68 (1982). In the face of ambiguous language, it is appropriate to look at the
statute as a whole in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve. See Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979); 2A C. Sands, supra, § 46.05.
60. See supra note 10.
61. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C), (D) (1982).
62. Id. § 552a(e)(10).
63. Id. § 552a(g)(1)(C).
64. See supra note 20. Although the law generally compensates such injuries to
dignity and personality with money damages, such damages are an inexact compensatory substitute. Because injuries to non-economic interests typically cannot be
measured in terms of out-of-pocket loss, plaintiffs who have suffered such injuries
may recover damages for their mental and physical injuries. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 903-904 (1977); D. Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.3; W. Prosser, supra
note 15, § 117, at 815.
65. See D. Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.1, at 509 ("[T]hough economic or physical
loss may be associated with the [dignitary] injury, the primary or usual concern is not
economic at all, but vindication of an intangible right."). In structuring remedies for
invasion of privacy the law has recognized that mental distress, humiliation, embarrassment and loss of reputation are usually the primary injuries, not out-of-pocket
losses. Id. at 509-10; see W. Prosser, supra note 15, § 117, at 815; cf. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974) (defamation); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S.
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of actual damages, limiting such damages to pecuniary loss, would
render the remedial provisions of the Act ineffective by excluding the
type of damages most likely to occur from the recovery available
under the Act. Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of "actual damages" would frustrate the intended purpose of the civil remedy because an inadequate recovery would reduce both the deterrent impact
on the government and the incentives for citizen enforcement. 6
2. Legislative History
The legislative history of the Privacy Act reveals that there was
bipartisan agreement in both the House6 7 and Senate6 8 that effective
privacy legislation was urgently needed. Congress, aware that federal
agencies were regularly gathering and using information for purposes
which overstepped those that the respective agencies were created to
serve,6 9 concluded that Congressional intervention was required to
protect personal privacy rights. 70 The civil-damages remedy was perceived by Congress as a vital element of the Privacy Act's enforcement
scheme. 71 There was, however, substantial disagreement between the
374, 384-85 n.9 (1967) (defamation and invasion of privacy). In the context of the
Privacy Act, both courts following the liberal and those following the restrictive view
have acknowledged that mental injury is a likely consequence of actionable invasions
of privacy. Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d
971, 977 (5th Cir. 1983) (liberal view); see Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 &
n.7 (11th Cir. 1982) (restrictive view). Although the Fitzpatrick court denied recovery for non-pecuniary harm, it recognized that the plaintiff had suffered "a general
mental injury from the disclosure." Id. at 331.
66. See Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d
971, 977 (5th Cir. 1983). See infra note 122.
67. The House version of the Privacy Act, H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974) (as amended October 2, 1974), reprintedin Sourcebook, supra note 6, at 258,
was passed by a vote of 353 to 1 on November 21, 1974. 120 Cong. Rec. 36,976
(1974).
68. The Senate version of the Privacy Act, S.3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974),
reprintedin Sourcebook, s-upra note 6, at 334, was adopted by a vote of 74 to 9 on
November 21, 1974. 120 Cong. Rec. 36,917 (1974).
69. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,912 (1974) (Government Operations Committee
Oversight); id. at 36,901-02 (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id. at 36,893-94 (remarks of
Sen. Percy); id. at 36,647 (remarks of Rep. Alexander); id. at 36,648 (remarks of
Rep. Goldwater); id. at 36,652 (remarks of Rep. Regula). Congressional recognition
of the tendency of government agencies to overstep their authority is reflected in the
duty imposed on agencies to "maintain in [their] records only such information about
an individual as is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agency
required to be accomplished by statute or by executive order of the President." 5
U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1) (1982). The term "maintain" in the context of the Privacy Act
"includes maintain, collect, use, or disseminate." Id. § 552a(a)(3).
70. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 2(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1896, 1896
(1974), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 552a note at 416-17 (1982).
71. See H.R. Rep. No. 1416, supra note 6, at 3-4, reprintedin Sourcebook, supra
note 6, at 296-97; S.Rep. No. 1183, supra note 6, at 82, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code
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House and Senate on the issue of the appropriate level of culpability
72
that would subject the government to civil damage liability.
a. The House Version of the Privacy Act
The House version of the Privacy Act, as originally introduced by
the Subcommittee on Government Operations, subjected the government to actual and punitive damages for an agency's willful refusal or
failure to comply with the Act. 73 The House Committee on Government Operations later voted to amend the bill and allow plaintiffs to
recover actual damages caused by an agency's "willful, arbitrary or
capricious" violation of the Act. 4 The House subsequently adopted
this version, but only after vigorous debate over a proposed amendment that provided for actual damages for any violations of the Act
and both actual and punitive damages for "willful, arbitrary or capricious" violations. 75 The existence of such strong sentiment in favor of
punitive damages makes it highly unlikely that the House intended to
severely restrict plaintiffs' potential recoveries by limiting actual damages to out-of-pocket loss. Moreover, it was recognized in debate that
mental harm was a probable consequence of governmental invasions
of privacy. 76 The only place in the legislative history that "actual

Cong. & Ad. News at 6,996; 120 Cong. Rec. 36,647-48 (1974) (remarks of Rep.
Alexander & Rep. Gude).
72. See 120 Cong. Rec. at 40,882 (1974) (Analysis of House and Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act); id. at 40,406 (Analysis of House and
Senate Compromise Amendments to the Federal Privacy Act).
73. H.R. 16,373, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 3(f)(3)(A) (1974), reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 6, at 250.
74. H.R. Rep. No. 1416, supra note 6, at 31-32 (1974), reprintedin Sourcebook,
supra note 6, at 324-25. In this form H.R. 16,373 was unanimously adopted by the
House Committee on Government Operations and submitted to the full House for
consideration. Id. at 10-11, reprinted in Sourcebook at 303-04. The punitive damages
provision in the original bill was deleted by the Committee on Government Operations over strong opposition. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,660 (1974) (remarks of Rep.
Moorhead) (punitive damages provision deleted by a vote of 18 to 14).
75. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,658-60 (1974) (debate on proposal to make the government liable for punitive damages); see also id. at 36,970 (remarks of Rep. Koch)
(omission of punitive damages liability regrettable); id. at 36,645 (remarks of Rep.
Abzug) (omission of punitive damages a major weakness).
76. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,904 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater). While discussing the need for the Privacy Act and its goals Senator Goldwater commented that
"privacy ... mean[s] the great common law tradition that a person has a right not to
be defamed[, which includes] the right to be protected against disclosure of ...
irrelevant embarrassing facts relating to one's own private life." Id. Representative
Ashbrook noted that "[a]s the Federal Government has grown in power, it has
increasingly intruded into the personal lives of its citizens." Id. at 36,971 (remarks of
Sen. Ashbrook). Such intrusions and disclosures are the types of injuries which cannot
be adequately measured in terms of out-of-pocket loss. See supra note 20. The most
graphic indication of Congressional awareness of the injuries most likely to be
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damages" is mentioned in connection with out-of-pocket loss is in a
short passage referring to a subsequently rejected amendment which
would have made the government liable for innocent violations of the
Act. 77 Consequently, limiting actual damages to out-of-pocket loss is
not supported by the legislative history of the House version of the
Act.
b. The Senate.Version of the Privacy Act

The original Senate version of the Privacy Act would have allowed
an individual to recover both actual and punitive damages, if appropriate, for any violation of the Act by any person. 7 After consideration by the full Senate, this provision was modified to allow plaintiffs
to recover actual and general damages, but in no event less than
$1,000, for any violation of the Act by any government officer or
employee. 79 In the case of many dignitary interests, general damages
are presumed by law without proof of the extent of the plaintiff's
injury because "the wrong is said to be damage in and of itself."80 Both
courts following the restrictive"' and those following the liberal
spawned by illegal invasions of privacy are the examples given by Representatives
and Senators of government agency abuse of their constitutent's privacy. 120 Cong.
Rec. 36,971 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Broomfield) (16 year old school girl the subject
of an F.B.I. record as a result of a misaddressed letter); id. at 36,896 (remarks of Sen.
Curtis) (unjustified IRS methods of investigation threatened to ruin Nebraska lawyer's reputation and practice); see id. at 36,901-03 (remarks of Sen. Jackson & Sen.
Nelson) (review of recent examples of government agency spying on American citizens).
77. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,955-56 (1974). In the debate over this amendment,
Representative Eckhardt stated: "There is nothing in this that would provide for any
damages beyond his actual out-of-pocket expenses.
... Id. at 36,956 (remarks of
Rep. Eckhardt). This statement apparently supports the restrictive view, and has
been relied on by one of the courts following the restrictive view. Houston v. United
States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24, 30 n.13 (D.D.C. 1979). This comment
must, however, be analyzed in context to properly gauge its import. Representative
Eckhardt made the statement as part of a hypothetical example of an innocent
violation of the Act involving only economic injury, not as a general comment on the
meaning of the term "actual damages." See 120 Cong. Rec. at 36,955-56 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Eckhardt). This conclusion is reinforced by comments of both
Representative Moorehead and Representative Eckhardt to the effect that actual
damages are proven compensatory damages. Id.; see Johnson v. Department of
Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d 971, 980 & n.24 (5th Cir. 1983).
78. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 304(b) (1974) (as introduced by Sen. Ervin),
reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 6, at 27.
79. Id. § 303(c), reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 6, at 371.
80. D. Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 528; see Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323, 346 (1974); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 904 comment a (1977); C.
McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages § 14, at 53-54 (1935).
81. See Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 331 (11th Cir. 1982); Albright v.
United States, 558 F. Supp. 260, 264 (D.D.C. 1982); Houston v. United States Dep't
of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24, 30 (D.D.C. 1979).
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view,8 2 however, concur that recovery of actual damages requires that
the extent of the injury stemming from the Privacy Act violation must
be proven.8 3 These courts differ solely on the question of the types of
injuries the plaintiff mayprove and thus recover as actual damages.
c. The Compromise Version of the Privacy Act
The remedial provisions of the House and Senate compromise bill,
subsequently enacted as the Privacy Act,8 4 allow successful plaintiffs
to recover their actual damages, but in no event less than $1,000,
85
caused by any agency's intentional or willful violation of the Act.
Two major compromises are reflected in the final version of the
remedial provisions. These compromises pertain to both the standard
of culpability and the measure of damages. The Act's requirement of
"intentional or willful" agency conduct is lower than the House standard of "willful, arbitrary or capricious" and significantly higher than
the Senate standard of "any violation." The original House measure of
damages was limited to "actual damages." The final version of the Act
incorporates the Senate's minimum recovery of $1,000 but omits the
Senate's "general damages" provision.
The change in the original House standard of conduct from "willful, arbitrary or capricious" to "intentional or willful" in the compromise version of the Act has been held by one court following the
restrictive view to represent an "obvious quid pro quo" for the change
in the Senate version
from "actual and general damages" to simply
"actual damages." 8 This compromise was construed to mean that
"actual damages" as used in the Act is intended to be synonymous
with special damages, which are limited to pecuniary loss. 87 There is
no reference, however, in the legislative history to such a compromise.8 8 In fact, both the House and Senate concurred that the final
version of the standard of conduct in the Act represents an independent compromise between the House and Senate versions.8 9 Thus, the

82. See Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d
971, 983-84 (5th Cir. 1983); Parks v. United States Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d
677, 683 (10th Cir. 1980) (dictum).
83. See Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d
971, 983 (5th Cir. 1983) (proven mental and physical injury); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665
F.2d 327, 331 (l1th Cir. 1982) (proven out-of-pocket loss).
84. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
85. Id. § 552a(g)(4)(A) (1982).
86. Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 330 (11th Cir. 1982).
87. Id.
88. See Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d
971, 981 n.27 (5th Cir. 1983).
89. See 120 Cong. Rec. 40,406-07 (1974) (Senate analysis of the Compromise
Amendments); id. at 40,882 (House analysis of the Compromise Amendments).
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argument that Congress intended actual damages to be limited to
special damages is tenuous. In light of the goals of the Privacy Act and
the independent compromises made with respect to its remedial provisions, it is far more likely that the Senate had intended "general
damages" to mean presumed compensatory damages and "actual
damages" to mean compensatory damages for proven injury.90
When drafting the Privacy Act, Congress was concerned with exposing the government to excessive damages liability. 91 Courts following the restrictive view have relied on the extensive legislative discussion of the potential for excessive government damages liability as an
indication of Congressional intent to limit actual damages to out-ofpocket loss. 92 Debate on potentially excessive liability, however, focused on establishing the proper level of conduct to trigger such
liability93 and whether punitive damages against the government
should be available. 94 There is no indication in the legislative history
of congressional intent to limit compensation to proven economic
losS. 9

5

It is highly probable that Congress was cognizant96 of the Supreme
Court's landmark decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. ,9 which
was decided a few months before the Privacy Act was debated. 9 The
Gertz Court held that awards of presumed damages to plaintiffs suing
the media for defamation would be unconstitutional in the absence of
"'actual malice," but compensatory damages may be awarded for
"actual injury." 99 The Court stated that actual injury includes mental

90. See Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d
971, 983 (5th Cir. 1983).
91. See 120 Cong. Rec. 36,955-57 (1974); id. at 36,659-60.
92. See Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 330 (11th Cir. 1982); Houston v.
United States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24, 30 (D.D.C. 1979).
93. See supra note 89.
94. See supra notes 75-89.
95. See Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d
971, 977-83 (5th Cir. 1983).
96. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979); 2A C. Sands,
supra note 59, § 50.01. Both the Eleventh Circuit and the PPSC concluded, without
reference to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), that it was highly
likely that Congress was using "defamation language" in drafting the remedial
provisions of the Act. Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 330-31 (11th Cir. 1982)
(quoting PPSC Report, supra note 9, at 530). The Fifth Circuit also decided that
Congress was probably using the terms "general" and "actual damages" in the
context of defamation and the Court's decision in Gertz. Johnson v. Department of
Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 700 F.2d 971, 982-83 (5th Cir. 1983).
97. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
98. Gertz was decided on June 25, 1974, and Congress considered the Privacy
Act in November of 1974. Id.; see 120 Cong. Rec. 36,885 (1974) (Senate); id. at
36,643 (House).
99. 418 U.S. at 349.
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distress, humiliation and embarrassment if proved by "competent
evidence" on the theory that such damages are a natural and probable
consequence of the wrongful conduct. 100 The torts of defamation and
invasion of privacy are closely related because they both protect dignitary interests and cause similar types of injuries.' 0 ' Congress most
likely was aware of both Gertz and the strong analogy between defamation and invasion of privacy, and it is therefore improbable that
Congress intended actual damages to be synonymous with special
damages. More probably, Congress was utilizing the term "actual
damages" in the Privacy Act in the same sense the Supreme Court
used "actual injury" in Gertz, and thus, the liberal view of actual
damages, allowing recovery for proven mental and physical injury, is
the only appropriate interpretation.
The Privacy Protection Study Commission (PPSC) was established
by the Privacy Act102 to study specified privacy issues and make legislative recommendations to Congress. 10 3 The PPSC initially concluded
"that Congress meant to restrict recovery to specific pecuniary losses
until the [PPSC] could weigh the propriety of extending the standard
of recovery."'10 4 Ultimately, however, the PPSC opined that "[i]f the
rights and interests established by the Privacy Act are worthy of
protection, then recovery for intangible injuries such as pain and
suffering, loss of reputation, or the chilling effect on constitutional
rights, is a part of that protection.'1 0 5 Consequently, the PPSC con-

100. Id. at 350. The Court concluded that allowing general damages in a defamation case involving the media, in the absence of actual malice, would be unconstitutional because it would aggravate the inhibiting effect of civil liability on the exercise
of first amendment rights. The Court went on to say, however, that there is no
constitutional bar to proven compensatory damages, and plaintiffs are entitled to
recover for their actual injury. Id.
101. See D. Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.1, at 509; W. Prosser, supra note 15, § 117,
at 813; Bloustein, supra note 19, at 993; Wade, Defamation and the Right of
Privacy, 15 Vand. L. Rev. 1093, 1094-95, 1120-21 (1962). The close connection
between the torts of invasion of privacy and defamation was also referred to in the
debate over the Privacy Act. 120 Cong. Rec. 36,904 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Goldwater).
102. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 5, 88 Stat. 1896, 1905 (1974).
103. Id.at 1905-10.
104. PPSC Report, supra note 9, at 530. The PPSC recognized that "actual
damages" is an ambiguous term, and concluded that Congress intended to equate
actual damages with special damages in the context of defamation with no further
analysis. Id. at 530-31; see Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue
Serv., 700 F.2d 971, 983 n.33 (5th Cir. 1983). Congress is charged with knowledge of
the common-law definitions of legal terms, 2A C. Sands, supra note 59, § 50.01, at
268, and therefore must have been cognizant of the traditional terms "general" and
"special damages." If Congress had intended "actual damages" to be equivalent to
"special damages," it is likely they would have used the term "special damages."
105. PPSC Report, supra note 9, at 531. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that
actual damages in the Privacy Act were intended to be synonymous with special
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cluded that the arguments in favor of a broad measure of damages
outweigh the arguments for limiting damages to out-of-pocket loss.'10
Congressional debate on the Act indicated a strong Congressional
intent that the remedial provisions effectively further the compensatory and deterrent goals of the Act. In light of the Act's legislative
history and the Supreme Court's decision in Gertz, a liberal interpretation of the term "actual damages" best reflects this legislative intent.
An analysis of analogous areas of the law reinforces a liberal interpretation.
3. Analogous Areas of the Law
An effective damages remedy is a vital element of any statutory
10 7
scheme designed to protect constitutionally guaranteed rights.
When a constitutionally protected interest is violated, the Supreme
Court has held that the courts should be flexible and use the remedy or
combination of remedies that best vindicates the right implicated. 08
This rule has been applied to cases involving the invasion of a constitutional right that is also protected by federal statute.' 0 9 Because the
damages remedy furnished by the Privacy Act is ambiguous, courts

damages in defamation on the basis of the initial finding of the PPSC. Fitzpatrick v.
IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 330-31 (11th Cir. 1982). The Eleventh Circuit, however, failed to
consider the subsequent finding and ultimate conclusion of the PPSC that only a
liberal approach to damages can give meaningful protection and compensation to the
interests safeguarded by the Privacy Act. See PPSC Report, supra note 9, at 531.
106. PPSC Report, supra note 9, at 530-31. The PPSC recommended that the
Privacy Act be amended to:
permit the recovery of special and general damages sustained by an individual as a result of a violation of the Act, but in no case should a person
entitled to recovery receive less than the sum of $1,000 or more than the sum
of $10,000 for general damages in excess of the dollar amount of any special
damages.
Id. at 531.
107. Cf. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651 (1980) (Municipalities
have no immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of constitutionally protected
interests and the good faith of their officers is not a shield against liability.). The
Court interpreted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 broadly to better effectuate the compensatory
and deterrent purposes of the statute. Id. at 651-52.
108. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245-48 (1979); Carey v. Piphus, 435
U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1208
(D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part by an equally divided Court and cert. dismissed in
part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (per curiam).
109. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-52 (1980) (42 U.S.C. §
1983); Carey v. Pipus, 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978) (same); Williams v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 660 F.2d 1267, 1272-73 (8th Cir. 1981) (title VII of the Civil Rights
Act); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (title III of the
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act), aff'd in part by an equally divided
Court and cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (per curiam).
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should be free to look to this flexible rule for guidance." 0 Mental and
physical injuries are the most probable types of harm resulting from
violations of the Act."' Consequently, a damages remedy that specifically excludes recovery for such injuries not only fails to best protect
the right implicated, but also prevents the effectuation of the goals of
the Privacy Act.
If a constitutionally-protected interest is similar to an interest protected by the common law of torts, courts generally look to the
common-law measure of damages for guidance as to the proper measure of damages." 2 The damages measure for the tort of invasion of
privacy that was relied upon by Congress when drafting the Act"l3 is

relevant to interpreting the term "actual damages." Tort law recognizes that mental distress is both a natural and probable consequence
of actionable invasions of privacy and a major component of the total
injury." 4 The tort of invasion of privacy is intended to protect dignitary interests and allows plaintiffs to recover damages for both harm
to the protected privacy interest and for proven mental distress. "5 The
types of injuries for which damages are recoverable under the tort of
invasion of privacy, therefore, are compatible with the liberal interpretation of "actual damages."
The use of the term "actual damages" as it is employed in federal
statutes enacted before the Privacy Act confirms a liberal construction." 06 In these federal statutes the term "actual damages" has been
interpreted in accordance with both the liberal" 7 and restrictive

110. See 2A C. Sands, supra note 59, § 50.01, at 268.
111. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
112. See Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1628 (1983); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 257-59 (1978); 2A C. Sands, supra note 59, § 50.04, at 279-80.
113. See supra note 26.
114. See supra notes 20, 65 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
116. See infra note 117. When interpreting ambiguous language in a federal
statute it is appropriate to look to the use of such language in other federal statutes.
See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99 (1979); 2A C. Sands,
supra note 59, § 45.09, at 30.
117. See Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 829 (8th Cir.) (award of actual
damages under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 for discriminatory practices), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634, 636-37 (7th
Cir. 1974) (same).
Congress specifically referred to the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) in the
debate on the Privacy Act, 120 Cong. Rec. 36,646 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Erlenborn), and in both the House and Senate committee reports on the Privacy Act. See
H.R. Rep. No. 1416, supra note 6, at 5, reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 6, at
298; S. Rep. No. 1183, supra note 6, at 85, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 6998. There are strong parallels between the Privacy Act and the FCRA,
which prescribes "actual damages" in its remedial provisions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n,
1681o (1982), and is aimed at protecting consumers from reporting agency invasions
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views."18 The restrictive view, however, has been followed only with
respect to statutes designed to protect purely economic interests.' 1
Under federal statutes aimed at protecting personal or dignitary interests courts have consistently interpreted "actual damages" to include
proven mental distress, humiliation and embarrassment in addition to
pecuniary loss.' 2 0 Because the Privacy Act is directed at protecting a
dignitary interest, this analogy militates strongly in favor of a liberal
interpretation of "actual damages." Moreover, a restrictive interpretation of "actual damages" is inconsistent with the pronounced tendency
of courts to interpret statutes liberally to best vindicate the protected
interest. 121

of privacy. Id. § 1681(a)(4). Judicial interpretation of the term "actual damages" in
the FCRA, before and after the passage of the Privacy Act, follows the liberal view
allowing recovery for mental and physical injury in addition to pecuniary loss.
Bryant v. TRW, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1234, 1239-40 & n.7 (E.D. Mich. 1980), aff'd,
689 F.2d 72 (6th Cir. 1982); Collins v. Retail Credit Co., 410 F. Supp. 924, 928, 932
(E.D. Mich. 1976); Millstone v. O'Hanlon Reports, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 269, 276
(E.D. Mo. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 829 (8th Cir. 1976).
118. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155 (1972) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Wolf v. Frank, 477 F.2d 467, 478-79 (5th Cir. 1973)
(same), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 43
(10th Cir. 1971) (same). Even in this area, however, there is authority for a broader
interpretation of "actual damages" which would allow recovery of possible profits
and benefits if they are not completely speculative. Gould v. American-Hawaiian
S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 781 (3d Cir. 1976); see Mullaney, Theories of Measuring
Damages in Security Cases and the Effects of Damageson Liability, 46 Fordham L.
Rev. 277, 280-81, 283-87 (1977).
119. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982) (Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 15
U.S.C. § 1989 (1982) (Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act); 17 U.S.C. §
101 (1976) (Copyright Revision Act of 1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504
(1982)).
120. See supra note 117.
121. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 3221, 3228 (1983). In
Guardians the Court noted the well-established rule "that where legal rights have
been invaded and a cause of action is available, a federal court may use any available
remedy to afford full relief." Id.; see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part by
an equally divided Court and cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981) (per
curiam). The Court has been particularly alert to provide adequate relief in the case
of statutes aimed at protecting important societal interests and constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuit, & Deferred Compensation Plans v. Norris, 103 S. Ct. 3492, 3502-03 (1983) (title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1982)
(Clayton Act); American Soc. of Mech. Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556,
572-73 (1982) (same); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1980) (42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342-44 (1979) (Clayton Act); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 258-59 (1978) (42 U.S.C. § 1983); Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1976) (title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
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III.

POLICY ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Economic Considerations
The more restrictive the measure of damages under the Privacy Act,

the less effectively the civil remedy will fulfill its deterrent and compensatory purposes. 12 2 Any remedy that excludes a major element of
plaintiffs' probable injuries necessarily represents a lower level of
compensation than one allowing plaintiffs to recover for all proven
injuries. Because the restrictive view precludes recovery of the major
element of injuries, a restrictive measure of damages may result in a
substantially lower recovery than a liberal measure. The diminished
recoveries obtainable under a restrictive view of "actual damages"
reduce the incentives for the "widest possible citizen enforcement"
envisioned by Congress.' 23 As a result, the deterrent effect of civil

damages on defendant agencies is proportionately reduced, and the
disincentive for governmental agency violations of the Act is lowered. 1 24 Too liberal a measure of damages, however, may reduce

government efficiency and result in unreasonably large government

damages liability. 125 The ideal measure of damages, therefore, would
balance these competing considerations to achieve the maximum level
of compensation and deterrence without exceeding the maximum

acceptable cost in loss of government efficiency and increased damages liability.
The effectiveness of the Act is similarly influenced by the degree of
difficulty of establishing liability. Requiring plaintiffs to meet strin-

122. See C. Veljanovski, The Economic Theory of Tort Liability- Toward a
Corrective Justice Approach, in The Economic Approach to Law 133-39 (1981).

Theories of economic efficiency assume that the defendant (violator) is a rational
decision-maker who will not invade a protected interest of the plaintiff if the cost of
doing so exceeds the benefit he derives from the invasion. Id. at 128, 132. Consequently, the efficiency of deterrence is directly related to the availability and magnitude of civil damages. Id. at 137-38. The deterrent effect of potential liability will be
weaker at a low level of damages than at a high level because there will be more
instances in which the benefits of invading the protected interest will outweigh the
consequences. Id. at 136-39. Although the rational decision-maker assumption may
be dubious in cases such as automobile accidents, it is appropriate in the context of
the Privacy Act which requires a deliberate-"intentional or willful"-violation
before liability is imposed. See id. at 130-31; E. Mackaay, Economics of Information
and Law 66-68, 70-71 (1982); R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law § 6.2, at 122-23,
§ 6.12, at 142-43 (2d ed. 1977).
123. S. Rep. No. 1183, supra note 6, at 83, reprintedin 1974 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 6997.
124. See supra note 122.
125. See C. Veljanovski, supra note 122, at 136-39. The objective of damages as a
deterrent is to induce the most economically efficient behavior. Too great a level of
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gent tests to establish government damages liability has the same
detrimental impact on the compensatory and deterrent goals of the
Act as a restrictive view of the measure of damages has. Alternatively,
liberal criteria for imposing liability on the government may have as
negative an effect on the goals of minimizing loss of governmental
efficiency and damages liability as would a liberal measure of damages.
Courts following the restrictive interpretation of "actual damages"
cite the protection of the government from excessive liability as a
crucial policy consideration in reaching their decision. 126 This justification is spurious in view of the many hurdles the plaintiff must
overcome in all actions brought under the Privacy Act before he is
entitled to any damages.
A plaintiff can recover only if the agency did not take "reasonable"
1 27
precautions to ensure the accuracy of records in its record system.
This "use of 'reasonableness' language creates loose and open-ended
standards" that can defeat many claims under the Act. 128 Further12
more, plaintiffs must prove that an improper disclosure occurred
and that the disclosure was the result of an "intentional or willful"

deterrence imposes an inordinately large cost on the injurer relative to the increase in
protection of the interest involved. Id.
126. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327, 330 (lth Cir. 1982); Houston v.
United States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24, 30 (D.D.C. 1979).
127. Edison v. Department of the Army, 672 F.2d 840, 843 (11th Cir. 1982)
(plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the agency was unreasonable); Savarese v.
United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 479 F. Supp. 304, 306 (N.D. Ga.
1979) (same), aff'd mem. sub nom. Savarese v. Harris, 620 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981). Reasonableness is determined by balancing
agency resources with the probability of a harmful disclosure. Thompson v. Department of Transp., United States Coast Guard, 547 F. Supp. 274, 283 (S.D. Fla. 1982);
Smiertka v. United States Dep't of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 447 F. Supp.
221, 226 n.35 (D.D.C. 1978), remanded on other grounds, 604 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
128. Smiertka v. United States Dep't of Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., 447 F.
Supp. 221, 226 n.35 (D.D.C. 1978), remandedon other grounds, 604 F.2d 698 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
129. Thomas v. United States Dep't of Energy, 719 F.2d 342, 345 (10th Cir.
1983). Courts have strictly construed 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1982) and require that the
disclosure be the direct and initial result of retrieval from a record in a system of
records. Id.; Doyle v. Behan, 670 F.2d 535, 538-39 (5th Cir. 1982); Olberding v.
United States, 564 F. Supp. 907, 913 (S.D. Iowa 1982), aff'd, 709 F.2d 621 (8th Cir.
1983). Furthermore, dissemination of information to persons already aware of the
information has been held not to be an actionable disclosure under the Privacy Act.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Dye, 642 F.2d 833, 836 (5th Cir. 1981); King v.
Califano, 471 F. Supp. 180, 181 (D.D.C. 1979).
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violation of the Act. 130 The plaintiff must also show an adverse effect 13 ' before any liability may be found. In practice this standard has
been a formidable barrier for plaintiffs to surmount. 32 The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the violation of the Act and the causal
relationship between that violation and the adverse effect. 1 33 Although Congress intended the Act to be an effective weapon which
citizens could use to vindicate their rights,13 4 courts have made this
goal extremely difficult to attain. This problem is compounded in
restrictive jurisdictions because not only are the prerequisites to liability applied so strictly as to defeat many claims, but also actual damages are construed so narrowly as to deny the successful plaintiff a
reasonable compensatory recovery. This result is inconsistent with the
goals and objectives of the Act. A liberal view, on the other hand,
allowing a successful plaintiff to receive full compensation for proven
injury, represents a far better balance between government and individual interests.

130. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1982). Congress defined the standard of "intentional
or willful" conduct as being "only somewhat greater than gross negligence." 120
Cong. Rec. 40,406 (1974). There is some confusion as to what this standard means,
and it has been applied to require varying degrees of scienter. Compare Parks v.
United States Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 1980) (willful and
intentional conduct does not require "premeditated malice") with Doe v. General
'Servs. Admin., 544 F. Supp. 530, 541 (D. Md. 1982) (willful and intentional means
an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of conduct) and Houston v. United
States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp. 24, 29 n.11 (D.D.C. 1979) (plaintiff must
show intentional agency conduct).
131. See Perry v. Block, 684 F.2d 121, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Parks v. United
States Internal Revenue Serv., 618 F.2d 677, 683 (10th Cir. 1980); Thompson v.
Department of Transp., United States Coast Guard, 547 F. Supp. 274, 284-85 (S.D.
Fla. 1982).
132. See Office of Information and Privacy, U.S. Department of Justice, Freedom
of Information 133-50 (1983). As of August 1983, the Department of Justice had
identified 60 reported cases brought under the Privacy Act which included damage
claims. Only four of these 60 cases have addressed the issue of the proper measure of
actual damages under the Act. Johnson v. Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue
Serv., 700 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983); Fitzpatrick v. IRS, 665 F.2d 327 (11th Cir.
1982); Albright v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 260 (D.D.C. 1982); Houston v. United
States Dep't of Treasury, 494 F. Supp 24 (D.D.C. 1979). The other 56 claims were
dismissed under the exceptions and exemptions to the Act or for failure to meet the
prerequisites to liability. Only two of the four remaining cases found that the
plaintiff was entitled to recover his actual damages, and they differ as to the proper
measure of those damages. See Johnson, 700 F.2d at 986 (actual damages include
proven mental and physical injuries); Fitzpatrick, 665 F.2d at 331 (actual damages
are limited to out-of-pocket loss).
133. See Edison v. Department of the Army, 672 F.2d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 1982);
Mervin v. FTC, 591 F.2d 821, 827 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
134. 120 Cong. Rec. 36,915 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Huddleston); id. at 36,652
(remarks of Rep. Biaggi).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52.

B. Legislative Recommendations
The threat of violations of individuals' privacy rights posed by the
information policies of government agencies mandate that privacy be
tenaciously safeguarded as a matter of policy. Since its inception, the
Privacy Act's civil remedies have been too difficult to obtain 35 to
encourage widespread citizen enforcement or to have a substantial
deterrent effect on government agencies. By amending the Act to
define "actual damages" as proven mental, physical and economic
injury, 136 Congress could eliminate the confusion surrounding the
scope of the term and achieve a more effective balance. The adoption
of a liberal view of the measure of damages would give plaintiffs a
reasonable prospect of meaningful recovery and also provide the necessary incentive to make the Act self-policing. Such a revision would
also enhance the deterrent effect of the Act by confronting agency
violators with a real prospect of substantial liability.
To further enhance the deterrent effect of the Act, individual officers and employees of the federal government should be personally
subject to punitive damages liability, up to a fixed statutory maximum, for knowing and willful violations of the Act. 137 Both Congress138 and the Supreme Court 139 have recognized that it is appropri-

135. See supra note 132.
136. See D. Dobbs, supra note 19, § 7.3, at 528; Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 652H (1976). See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text. Permitting recovery for
this combination of injuries vill allow plaintiffs to obtain meaningful and comprehensive compensation for injuries caused by violations of the Act. This definition of
"actual damages" is consistent with the traditional measures of general and special
damages. By clarifying the damages provision of the Act in this way Congress can
achieve an optimum balance between the compensatory and deterrent goals of the
Act and the concern over unrestricted government damage liability.
137. Currently, the only individual liability under the Privacy Act is criminal
liability. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i) (1982). The Privacy Act imposes criminal liability on
government officers and employees for certain "willful" violations of the Act, id.
§ 552a(i)(1), (2), and on any person who "knowingly and willfully" obtains information fraudulently from an agency in violation of the Act, id. § 552a(i)(3). Because
criminal sanctions can be prosecuted only by the government, see Windsor v. The
Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1983), and the Privacy Act was intended to
encourage widespread citizen enforcement, imposing punitive damages liability on
individuals for knowing and willful violations of the Act would more effectively
further the self-enforcement and deterrent purposes of the Act.
138. I.R.C. § 7217 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Congess has exposed all persons,
including government agency officers and employees, to liability for punitive damages for unauthorized disclosures of tax return information resulting from willful or
grossly negligent conduct. Id. § 7217(c); Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 905-06
(10th Cir. 1983). Thus Congress has, since the passage of the Privacy Act, determined
that individual punitive damages liability is an effective mechanism to deter improper disclosures of information by agency personnel. It is noteworthy that the
original Senate version of the Privacy Act would have made any person liable for any
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ate to impose punitive damages liability on individual government
officers and employees to deter conduct that is outside the scope of
their legitimate authority. Individual defendants, however, should be
liable only when there is a high degree of scienter, such as knowing
and willful conduct, because too broad a scope of personal liability
would have an inordinately negative effect on the efficient operation
of government. Such a revision of the Act would make it a truly
effective weapon with which citizens could protect their rights.
CONCLUSION

Congress repeatedly emphasized the overwhelming importance of
privacy as a fundamental element of freedom and democracy during
debate on the Privacy Act. The Act is currently the only comprehensive legislation protecting citizens' privacy rights from unwarranted
invasions by federal government agencies. Through its civil remedy,
the Act is aimed at deterring future intrusions on this critical right and
at compensating the victims of illegal invasions of privacy. The language and legislative history of the Act indicate that Congress intended the term "actual damages" to be interpeted broadly to best
effectuate the Act's provisions. Economic analysis of the Act demonstrates that a liberal view maximizes the deterrent and compensatory
impact of the Act without exposing the government to undue liability
or loss in efficiency. If Congress is truly concerned about the Orwellian prophecy' 4 ° of an omnipresent, omnipotent bureaucracy, it should

violation of the Act and allowed plaintiffs to recover punitive damages where appropriate. S. 3418, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. § 304(b) (1974) (as introduced by Sen. Ervin),
reprinted in Sourcebook, supra note 6, at 27. With the exception of the standard of
conduct triggering liability, the punitive damages provision of the original version of
the Privacy Act, id., was very similar to the punitive damages provision of I.R.C.
§ 7217(c). Furthermore, both the original version of the Privacy Act and I.R.C.
§ 7217(c) are, in part, aimed at deterring unauthorized disclosure of personal information by government agencies. The Sixth Circuit recently commented, in the
context of the Privacy Act, that Congress has the ability to subject government
officials to individual liability for violations of the Act. Windsor v. The Tennessean,
719 F.2d 155, 160 & n.5 (6th Cir. 1983).
139. See, e.g., Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1983) (42 U.S.C § 1983);
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 269-70 (1981) (same); Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21-22 (1980) (constitutional tort action for violation of the
eighth amendment); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 & n.11 (1978) (42 U.S.C §
1983). Furthermore, the Court has expressed scepticism concerning the effect that
governmental liability will have on deterring illegal acts by officers and employees of
government agencies. Moreover, the Court has stated that individual liability will
have the most effective deterrent impact. City of Newport, 453 U.S. at 269-70;
Carlson, 446 U.S. at 21-27.
140. E.g., 120 Cong. Rec. 36,912 (Government Operations Committee Oversight)
(quoting testimony of Dr. Alan F. Westin); id. at 36,904 (remarks of Sen. Goldwater); id. at 36,647 (remarks of Rep. Alexander); id. at 36,652 (remarks of Rep.
Regula).
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amend the Act to clarify and expand its damages provisions. Until this
occurs the judiciary has a duty to interpret "actual damages" as it was
intended by Congress-in accordance with a liberal view.
Frederick Z. Lodge

